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Abstract
The replicator equation is ubiquitous for many areas of mathematical biology. One of major
shortcomings of this equation is that it does not allow for an explicit spatial structure. Here
we review analytical approaches to include spatial variables to the system. We also provide a
concise exposition of the results concerning the appearance of spatial patterns in replicator reaction-
diffusion systems.
Keywords: Replicator equation, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stable state, reaction-diffusion
systems
AMS Subject Classification: Primary: 35K57, 35B35, 91A22; Secondary: 92D25
1 Replicator equation
The now classical replicator equation arises naturally in several important evolutionary contexts [30,
31, 40]. The most straightforward way to write down the replicator equation is to start with a
symmetric two player game with a payoff matrix A = (aij)k×k, where aij denotes the payoff of player
one if player one uses pure strategy i against pure strategy j used by player two. Let p = (p1, . . . , pk)
denote a mixed strategy, which belongs to the simplex Sk = {p ∈ R
k :
∑
i pi = 1, pi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , k}.
The average payoff of pure strategy i against p is (Ap)i =
∑
j aijpj, and the average payoff of mixed
strategy q against p is 〈q,Ap〉 =
∑
i qi(Ap)i =
∑
ij aijpiqj.
For the following we will need the notion of the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium of the
game with the payoff matrix A is defined as such strategy pˆ ∈ Sk that fares best against itself, i.e.
〈p,Apˆ〉 ≤ 〈pˆ,Apˆ〉, (1)
for any p ∈ Sk.
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Now let us identify the payoff of a game with an individual’s fitness and instead of two players
consider a populations of players, each of which can use one out of k different strategies (these strategies
can be mixed in general, but at this point it is more transparent to assume that the strategies are
pure). The reproductive success of an individual using strategy i depends on its average payoff (Ap)i
assuming random encounters with other individuals. Here p ∈ Sk is the current structure of the
population, pi = ni/N , where ni is the absolute number of players using strategy i and N =
∑
j nj is
the total population size. We obtain, in a usual manner, that
n˙i
ni
= (Ap)i, i = 1, . . . , k. (2)
System (2) can be called a selection system, according to the general terminology [34, 35]. If instead
of absolute sizes we consider the corresponding frequencies, system (2) reduces to
p˙i = pi((Ap)i − 〈p,Ap〉), i = 1, . . . , k. (3)
Equation (3) in this general form was written down first in [42] and was dubbed “replicator equation”
in [40]; particular cases of (3) were considered previously in the population genetics [30, 41] and in
the mathematical theories of prebiotic molecular evolution [8, 21, 22, 23]. Note that if a solution to
system (2) is known then the corresponding solution to (3) can be calculated. In general different
selection systems of the form (2) correspond to the replicator equation (3); e.g., instead of (Ap)i one
can consider the fitness of the form (Ap)i + F (N), where F is an arbitrary function (see also [35]).
There exists a parallel between the concepts of game theory with the payoff matrix A and the
behavior of the solutions to the replicator equation (3). For example, if pˆ ∈ Sk is a Nash equilibrium
then pˆ is a stationary point of (3). If pˆ is a stationary point of (3) and Lyapunov stable then pˆ is a
Nash equilibrium.
Another important notion of the game theory is that of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Strategy
pˆ is called ESS if (1) holds for any p ∈ Sk and, additionally, for all p 6= pˆ such that 〈p,Apˆ〉 = 〈pˆ,Apˆ〉
it is true that 〈p,Ap〉 < 〈pˆ,Ap〉. It can be proved that the last two conditions are equivalent to
〈pˆ,Ap〉 > 〈p,Ap〉 (4)
for all p ∈ Sk from some neighborhood of pˆ. With some abuse of notation a stationary point pˆ of (3)
is called an evolutionary stable state (and abbreviated the same ESS) if (4) holds; being ESS implies
that pˆ is asymptotically stable (the opposite is not true).
Equation (3) is unrealistic in that it ignores the population structure, all the individuals using the
same strategies are supposed to be identical, the population itself being well mixed. The population
structure can have different nature, e.g., the contact structure, age structure, physiological structure,
etc [37, 38]. One extremely important structural variable is the space [20]. Among different modeling
approaches to include the spatial structure in the model, reaction-diffusion equations take an important
part [12].
2 Reaction-diffusion replicator equation
The usual tactics to consider mathematical models with explicit spatial structure is to replace a system
of ordinary differential equations
n˙ = f(n)
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with the system of partial differential equations of the form
∂tn = f(n) +D∆n,
where D is a diagonal matrix of diffusion coefficients and ∆ is the Laplace operator. This approach
however fails in general with the replicator equation (3) because there is an additional condition that
p ∈ Sk. The only case when this condition can be met is when all the diffusion coefficients are identical
(this case is a generalization of the classical work [27]). In this case we obtain the following system of
reaction diffusion equations
∂tpi = pi((Ap)i − 〈p,Ap〉) + d∆pi, i = 1, . . . , k, (5)
that was studied in [28] together with the boundary conditions ∂lpi = 0, where l is the normal to the
boundary of the domain in which the solution to (5) is sought, we denot this domain Ω.
The following main result concerning (5) was proved in [28]:
Theorem 1. Let system (3) have an inner asymptotically stable stationary point pˆ ∈ intSk = {p ∈
Sk : p > 0}. Then pˆ is a globally asymptotically stable stationary point of (5) for any diffusion
coefficient d.
There are several possible approaches to study the replicator equation with explicit space with
different diffusion coefficients. The first approach by Vickers and co-authors uses the principle of local
population regulation such that the fitness values are adjusted in such a way so that the total local
population size stays constant [26, 32, 33, 43, 44, 45]. To be more precise, as a counterpart of (3)
Vickers et al. consider the system
∂tni = ni((Ap)i − 〈p,Ap〉) + di∆pi, i = 1, . . . , k, (6)
which is written for the absolute sizes ni(x, t), where x ∈ Ω ⊂ R
m, m = 1, 2, 3. System (6) should be
supplemented with the initial and boundary conditions.
Another approach by Cressman and co-authors [13, 14, 39] is to consider system (2) first and then
add the space. This approach also uses absolute sizes for the subpopulations using different strategies:
∂tni = ni((Ap)i + F (N)) + di∆pi, i = 1, . . . , k, (7)
where F is typically a smooth decreasing function. A similar approach to consider “open” replicator
systems is discussed in [7].
Both systems (6) and (7) are equivalent to the replicator equation (3) when there is no spatial
structure, however they have remarkably different behaviors for di > 0 (see below).
Finally, another approach was used in [8, 9, 10, 11, 46] to study a spatially explicit counterpart of
the replicator equation (3). In short, we start with the system for the absolute sizes
n˙i = ni(Ap)i + di∆pi, i = 1, . . . , k,
and use the transformation pi = ni/
∑
j
∫
Ω
nj(x, t) dx to obtain
∂tpi = pi [(Ap)i − f
sp(t)] + di∆pi, i = 1, . . . , k. (8)
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Here pi = pi(x, t), x ∈ Ω, ∂t =
∂
∂t
, ∆ is the Laplace operator, and di > 0, i = 1, . . . , k are the diffusion
coefficients. The initial conditions are pi(x, 0) = ϕi(x), i = 1, . . . , k, and
f sp(t) =
∑
i
∫
Ω
pi(Ap)i dx =
∫
Ω
〈p, Ap〉 dx. (9)
For the system (8) we have the condition of the global regulation
∑
i
∫
Ω
pi(x, t) dx = 1. (10)
Solutions to (8) now belong to the analog of the simplex Sk(Ωt), Ωt = Ω × [0,∞) and for any time
moment t are assumed to belong to the Sobolev space W2(Ω) and satisfy condition (10).
Formally, system (8) can be obtained from (7) if we assume that N = N(t) =
∑
i
∫
Ω
ni(x, t) dx,
therefore the results for systems (7) and (8) should be similar.
We are mostly interested in the steady state solutions to the replicator reaction-diffusions systems.
Of especial interest is the stability of spatially homogeneous stationary points, which are also stationary
solutions to the replicator equation (3). For systems (6) and (7) it is possible to study also traveling
wave solutions, but these particular kinds of solutions are not considered here (see for an extensive
discussion, e.g., [14, 25, 26, 29, 32, 44]).
3 Turing instabilities and spatial patterns in replicator reaction-
diffusion systems
Let us assume that pˆ ∈ intSk is an ESS for the game with payoff matrixA. Then it is an asymptotically
stable state of the replicator equation (3). This stationary point is also a spatially homogeneous
stationary solution for the systems (7), (8) (with some choice of N = Nˆ) and (9). Will this solution
be asymptotically stable for the spatially explicit systems?
For the system (6) Vickers [43] proved the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Let pˆ be an ESS of the game with the payoff matrix A. Then nˆ = Nˆ pˆ is an asymptotically
stable spatially homogeneous stationary solution to (6) for any diffusion coefficients.
If pˆ ∈ intSk, Theorem 2 is a generalization of Theorem 1. The major difference of system (7) is
that an ESS can become unstable for the system with the space. In general, it holds that
Theorem 3. Let pˆ be an ESS of the game with the payoff matrix A. Then nˆ = Nˆ pˆ is a spatially
homogeneous solution to (7), which can become unstable in spatially explicit system for a particular
choice of A and diffusion coefficients.
Several theorems on the behavior of the ESSs, which specify exact conditions on the appearance
of the spatial patterns for particular cases k = 2, 3 can be found in [14].
Using system (8) it is possible to give more exact general statements concerning appearance of
the spatially inhomogeneous solutions [9, 10, 11]. In particular, the following necessary condition was
proved in [11].
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Theorem 4. Let pˆ ∈ intSn be an asymptotically stable rest point of (3). Then for this point to be
an asymptotically stable homogeneous stationary solution to (8) it is necessary that
∑
i
di >
β
λ1
, β = 〈Apˆ, pˆ〉, (11)
where λ1 is the first non-zero eigenvalue of the following eigenvalue problem
∆ψ(x) + λψ(x) = 0, x ∈ Ω, ∂lψ|x∈Γ = 0.
Theorem 4 points out that to expect an appearance of spatially inhomogeneous solutions the
diffusion coefficients have to be sufficiently small. For some particular choices of A it is possible to
give an exact conditions for the appearance of spatial patterns [9, 10]. In particular, consider matrix
A of the form
A =


a1 0 . . . 0
0 a2 . . . 0
. . .
0 . . . 0 ak

 ,
then (see [10])
Theorem 5. There exists a spatially non-uniform stationary solution to (8) with the given A in case
of Ω = [0, 1] if ∑
i
di
ai
<
1
pi2
.
Moreover, using the special hamiltonian form of the equations for the stationary solutions to (8)
it is possible to obtain a parametric form for these spatially non-uniform solutions [9, 10].
4 Distributed Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stable state (DESS)
Since the appearance of spatially heterogeneous solutions in system (8) is a generic phenomenon, it is
necessary to study the asymptotic behavior of the distributed system, especially given the fact that
for some values of the diffusion coefficients there are no stable spatially homogeneous solutions in
the system. We approached this problem by considering a generalization of the notions of the Nash
equilibria and ESS to the spatially explicit case [11].
Definition 1. We shall say that the vector function wˆ(x) ∈ Sk(Ω) is a distributed Nash equilibrium
if ∫
Ω
〈u(x, t), Awˆ(x)〉 dx ≤
∫
Ω
〈wˆ(x), Awˆ(x)〉 dx (12)
for any vector-function u(x, t) ∈ Sk(Ωt), u(x, t) 6= wˆ(x).
Definition 2. We shall say that wˆ(x) ∈ Sk(Ω) is a distributed evolutionary stable state (DESS ) if∫
Ω
〈wˆ(x), Au(x, t)〉dx >
∫
Ω
〈u(x, t), Au(x, t)〉 dx (13)
for any u(x, t) ∈ Sk(Ωt) from a neighborhood of wˆ(x) ∈ Sk(Ω), u(x, t) 6= wˆ(x).
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We also need the following stability notion
Definition 3. Stationary solution wˆ(x) ∈ Sk(Ω) to (8) is stable in the sense of the mean integral
value if for any ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for the initial data ϕi(x) of system (8), which satisfy
|ϕ¯i − ˆ¯wi| < δ, i = 1, . . . , n,
where
ϕ¯i =
∫
Ω
ϕi(x) dx, ˆ¯wi =
∫
Ω
wˆi(x) dx,
it follows that
|u¯i(t)− ˆ¯wi| < ε
for any i = 1, . . . , n and t > 0.
Here u¯i(t) =
∫
Ω
ui(x, t) dx and ui(x, t), i = 1, . . . , n are the solutions to (8), u(x, t) ∈ Sk(Ωt).
Using these definitions we can prove the following theorems [11]
Theorem 6. If wˆ(x) ∈ intSk(Ω) is a Lyapunov stable stationary solution to (8) then wˆ(x) is a
distributed Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 7. Let wˆ ∈ intSk be a spatially homogeneous solution to (8) (i.e., wˆ ∈ intSk is a rest point
of (3)). If wˆ is DESS then wˆ is an asymptotically stable solution to (8) in the sense of the mean
integral value.
In words, Theorem 7 implies that if pˆ ∈ Sk is an ESS, then the corresponding spatially homogeneous
solution will stay stable, albeit in the weaker mean integral sense if pˆ is DESS. The sufficient condition
of being DESS is given by
Theorem 8. The stationary point pˆ ∈ intSk is a DESS if
〈Ac0(t), c0(t)〉 ≤ −γ2|c0(t)|2, γ > 0 (14)
for any c0(t) satisfying
∑
i c
0
i (t) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 8 can be found in [11] together with some examples.
5 Discussion
Here we give a short review of the analytical work on the replicator reaction-diffusion equations. There
are different approaches to include the explicit space in the replicator equation (3). One of them, by
Vickers et al., supposes that there is local regulation of the population. While this approach yields
simple results (see Theorem 2) concerning the appearance of spatial patterns, it is difficult to assume
that the principle of local regulation is abundant in real systems. The approach used by Cressman and
co-authors (equation (7)) [13, 14] and our approach (equation (8)) both imply the principle of global
regulation whereas the total population size is being regulated by internal or external means (see also
[46] for discussion). The major difference between the local and global regulation approaches appears
when a fate of an ESS of the local replicator system is studied. While in system (6) this stationary point
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remains stable, in systems (7) and (8) this point can loose its stability through Turing’s mechanism.
The analysis of system (8) shows that this is probable when the diffusion coefficients are sufficiently
small.
The approach, adopted in our works [9, 11], allows for further generalizations of the notions of the
Nash equilibria and ESS. In general, we can conjecture that the behavior of the distributed replicator
equation of the form (8) mimics that of the local system (3) if the stability notion is replaced with a
weaker notion of the stability in the mean integral sense.
The reviewed approaches are not the only possible ways to study replicator equations with explicit
space. A lot of work was devoted to the study of particular class of replicator equations arising in the
area of mathematical models of prebiotic evolution [10, 23]. In particular, appearance of spiral ways
was studied by means of numerical simulations of some partial differential equations [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]
and cellular automata [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. These approaches are complementary to those considered in this
short note. It is also possible to consider evolutionary systems with discrete state space (e.g., [1, 24, 36])
but in general the better elaborated theory of reaction-diffusion equations allows deaper analytical
insights into the behavior of replicator equations with explicit spatial structure.
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